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1 Introduction
In many combinatorial optimization problems one needs to impose one or
more all-different constraints, i.e., conditions of the following type: for a
given family of discrete variables, no two variables can be assigned the same
value. All-different constraints arise, for instance, in problems related to
timetabling, scheduling, manufacturing, and in several variants of the as-
signment problem (see, e.g., [WY01, MMA12] and the references therein).
Though all-different constraints are mainly studied in the context of
Constraint Programming (see, e.g., [vH01]), when dealing with a problem
that can be modeled as an integer linear program it is useful to have in-
formation on the polyhedral structure of the feasible solutions to a system
of all-different constraints. For this reason, several authors studied linear-
inequality formulations for the convex hull of solutions to a single all-different
constraint or a system of all-different constraints [MMA12, WY01, Mag13,
Lee02]. We remark that in some cases these descriptions are extended for-
mulations, i.e., they make use of additional variables; however, here we are
only interested in the description of the convex hull in the original space of
variables.
If n variables x1, . . . , xn can take values in a finite domain D ⊆ R and
an all-different constraint is imposed on them, we will write (following the
notation of [MMA12])
{x1, . . . , xn}6= (1)
x1, . . . , xn ∈ D. (2)
Williams and Yan [WY01] proved that if D = {1, . . . , d} for some positive
integer d, then the convex hull of the vectors that satisfy (1)–(2) is described
by the linear system ∑
j∈S
xj ≥ f(S), S ⊆ [n], (3)
∑
j∈S
xj ≤ g(S), S ⊆ [n], (4)
where [n] = {1, . . . , n} and, for S ⊆ [n], we define
f(S) =
|S|(|S| + 1)
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and g(S) = |S|(d+ 1)− f(S). (5)
Note that f(S) is the sum of the |S| smallest positive integers, while g(S) is
the sum of the |S| largest integers that do not exceed d, therefore inequalities
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(3)–(4) are certainly valid for every vector x satisfying (1)–(2). The result
extends to an arbitrary finite domainD ⊆ R (with |D| ≥ n) by defining f(S)
(resp., g(S)) as the sum of the smallest (resp., largest) elements in D, for
every S ⊆ [n]. Note however that in the following we assume D = {1, . . . , d}
for some positive integer d.
Williams and Yan [WY01] showed that if d > n then all of inequalities
(3)–(4) are facet-defining, thus the convex hull of (1)–(2) needs an exponen-
tial number of inequalities to be described in the original space of variables
x1, . . . , xn. However, they also gave polynomial-size extended formulations
for the convex hull of (1)–(2).
When n = d, (1)–(2) is the set of permutations of the elements in [n],
and its convex hull is called permutahedron. In this case, the whole family
of inequalities (4) can be dropped and replaced by the equation
∑
i∈[n] xj =
f([n]). The permutahedron admits an extended formulation with O(n log n)
constraints and variables [Goe09].
System (3)–(4) not only defines an integral polyhedron, but it also has
the stronger property of being totally dual integral. We recall that a linear
system of inequalities Ax ≤ b is said to be totally dual integral if for every
integer vector c such that the linear program max{cx : Ax ≤ b} has fi-
nite optimum, the dual linear program has an optimal solution with integer
components. It is known that if Ax ≤ b is totally dual integral and b is
an integer vector, then the polyhedron defined by Ax ≤ b is integral. The
total dual integrality of system (3)–(4) follows from the fact that f (resp.,
g) is a supermodular (resp., submodular) function, along with a classical re-
sult on polymatroid intersection [Edm70] (see also [Sch03, Theorem 46.2]).
A complete proof of the total dual integrality of (3)–(4) can be found in
[Mag13].
In a more general setting, we might have m ≥ 1 all-different constraints,
each enforced on a different subset of variables Ni ⊆ [n], i ∈ [m]. In this
case, we have the system of conditions
{xj : j ∈ Ni}6=, i ∈ [m], (6)
x1, . . . , xn ∈ D. (7)
The following inequalities are of course valid for the convex hull of solutions
to (6)–(7): ∑
j∈S
xj ≥ f(S), S ⊆ Ni, i ∈ [m], (8)
∑
j∈S
xj ≤ g(S), S ⊆ Ni, i ∈ [m]. (9)
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However, the above inequalities do not give, in general, the convex hull of
the vectors that satisfy (6)–(7). Furthermore, there are examples in which
some integer solutions to system (8)–(9) do not lie in the convex hull of the
points satisfying (6)–(7).
A special case, studied in [MMA12], in which constraints (8)–(9) do yield
the convex hull of solutions to (6)–(7) is now described. Define N = [n] and
assume that N = T ∪ U , where T and U are disjoint nonempty subsets of
N . Define Ti = Ni ∩ T and Ui = Ni ∩ U for i ∈ [m]. If the Ti’s form a
monotone family of subsets (T1 ⊇ T2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Tm) and the Ui’s are pairwise
disjoint, then Magos et al. [MMA12] say that the inclusion property holds.
They showed that in this case inequalities (8)–(9) provide the convex hull
of solutions to (6)–(7).
The proof of Magos et al. [MMA12] is rather lengthy and involved (over-
all, it consists of about 25 pages). The purpose of this note is to give a simple
proof of their result. Indeed, we show something more: we prove that, under
the inclusion property, system (8)–(9) is totally dual integral. Our proof is
an extension of the classical proof of the total dual integrality of polyma-
troids (see, e.g., [Sch03, Chapter 44]). Specifically, in Section 2 we describe
a greedy algorithm that solves linear optimization over (8)–(9), under the
inclusion property. The correctness of the algorithm is shown in Section 3
by completing the solution returned by the algorithm with a dual solution
such that the complementary slackness conditions are satisfied. The result
of Section 3 also implies the total dual integrality of system (8)–(9), as the
dual solution is integer whenever the primal objective function coefficients
are all integers. We conclude in Section 4 with an extension of the result.
2 Primal algorithm
Assume that the inclusion property holds for an all-different system (6)–(7).
Recall that:
• N = [n] = T ∪ U , with T and U disjoint and nonempty;
• Ti = Ni ∩ T and Ui = Ni ∩ U for i ∈ [m];
• T1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Tm;
• Ui ∩ Uj = ∅ for all distinct i, j ∈ [m].
Wlog, N = N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nm and T = T1 = [t] for some positive integer t.
Also, recall that D = [d]. We assume that d ≥ maxi∈[m] |Ni|, otherwise
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both (6)–(7) and (8)–(9) are infeasible. We use the notation ti = |Ti| and
ui = |Ui| for i ∈ [m].
In what follows, we will sometimes identify an index j ∈ N with the
corresponding variable xj ; e.g., we will indifferently say “the indices in T”
or “the variables in T”.
Consider the problem of minimizing a linear objective function cx over
the polytope defined by (8)–(9), where c is a row-vector in Rn. If we define
S =
⋃
i∈[m]{S : S ⊆ Ni}, the problem of minimizing cx over the polytope
defined by (8)–(9) can be written as follows:
min cx (10)
s.t.
∑
j∈S
xj ≥ f(S), S ∈ S, (11)
−
∑
j∈S
xj ≥ −g(S), S ∈ S. (12)
We give a greedy algorithm that solves the above linear program for an
arbitrary c ∈ Rn. Since the solution returned by the algorithm will be a
vector satisfying (6)–(7), this will prove that system (11)–(12) (i.e., system
(8)–(9)) defines the convex hull of (6)–(7). The algorithm that we present
can be seen as an extension of the greedy algorithm for polymatroids (see,
e.g., [Sch03, Chapter 44]), and also as an extension of the algorithm given
in [Mag13] for the case m = 1.
The procedure is shown in Algorithm 13 and is now illustrated. Through-
out the algorithm, we maintain d clusters of variables V1, . . . , Vd, i.e., d
(possibly empty) disjoint subsets of N gathering those variables that will be
assigned the same value at the end of the algorithm. At the beginning (lines
2–3) we have t nonempty clusters V1, . . . , Vt, where Vj = {j} for j ∈ [t], while
the other clusters Vt+1, . . . , Vd are empty. Thus every variable in T = [t] is
assigned to a different cluster (as these variables are not allowed to take
the same value), while the variables in U are not assigned to any cluster.
During the execution of the algorithm, each variable in U will be assigned
to a cluster, and no variable will be ever moved from a cluster to another.
Notation r(j) indicates the index of the cluster to which variable xj is
assigned. With each cluster Vj, j ∈ [d], we associate a pseudo-cost γj, which
is the sum of the costs of all variables in the cluster.
For i = 1, . . . ,m, at the ith iteration of the algorithm we assign each
variable in Ui to a different cluster (lines 4–10). Note that a variable in
Ui cannot be assigned to a cluster Vj with j ∈ Ti, as Vj contains j for
every j ∈ Ti and no variable in Ui is allowed to take the same value as a
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variable in Ti. Thus only the clusters Vj with j ∈ [d] \ Ti are feasible for
the variables in Ui. Lines 5–6 order the feasible clusters and the variables in
Ui according to their pseudo-costs and costs, respectively (with ties broken
arbitrarily). This is needed to assign the variables in Ui to the feasible
clusters in a greedy fashion (line 8): among the variables with nonnegative
cost, the one with the highest cost is assigned to the feasible cluster with
the highest pseudo-cost (independently of the sign of the pseudo-cost), then
the variable with the second highest cost is assigned to the feasible cluster
with the second highest pseudo-cost, and so on; on the other hand, among
the variables with negative cost, the one with the smallest cost is assigned
to the feasible cluster with the smallest pseudo-cost, then the variable with
the second smallest cost is assigned to the feasible cluster with the second
smallest pseudo-cost, and so on. Lines 9 and 10 consequently update the
clusters and the pseudo-costs.
At the end of the above procedure, we simply assign value 1 to the
variables in the cluster with the highest pseudo-cost, value 2 to those in the
cluster with second highest pseudo-cost, and so forth (lines 11–12).
Algorithm 1: Greedy algorithm for linear optimization over an all-
different system with the inclusion property.
1 begin
2 for each j ∈ [t] do Vj := {j}, γj := cj , r(j) := j;
3 for each j ∈ [d] \ [t] do Vj := ∅, γj := 0;
4 for i = 1, . . . ,m do
5 define a bijection σ : [d− ti]→ [d] \ Ti such that
γσ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ γσ(d−ti);
6 define a bijection pi : [ui]→ Ui such that cpi(1) ≥ · · · ≥ cpi(ui);
7 for each j ∈ [ui] do
8 if cpi(j) ≥ 0 then r(pi(j)) := σ(j) else
r(pi(j)) := σ(d− ti − ui + j);
9 Vr(pi(j)) := Vr(pi(j)) ∪ {pi(j)};
10 γr(pi(j)) := γr(pi(j)) + cpi(j);
11 define a bijection σ : [d]→ [d] such that γσ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ γσ(d);
12 for each j ∈ N do x¯j := σ
−1(r(j));
13 return x¯
Note that if two variables belong to the same set Ni for some i ∈ [m],
then they are assigned to different clusters; therefore they receive different
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values. This implies that the solution returned by the algorithm satisfies the
given all-different system (6)–(7), and thus also (11)–(12). The optimality
of the solution will follow from the existence of a dual solution satisfying the
complementary slackness conditions, as we prove in the next section.
3 Dual solution and total dual integrality
Theorem 3.1. Under the inclusion property, inequalities (8)–(9) define the
convex hull of the vectors satisfying (6)–(7).
Proof. We show that for every c ∈ Rn the linear program (10)–(12) has an
optimal solution that satisfies (6)–(7). For this purpose, fix c ∈ Rn and
run Algorithm 13. Let x¯ be the solution returned by the algorithm. Since
x¯ satisfies (6)–(7), we only need to prove that x¯ is an optimal solution to
(10)–(12).
Consider the dual problem of (10)–(12):
max
∑
S∈S
(
f(S)yS − g(S)zS
)
(13)
s.t.
∑
S∈S:j∈S
(yS − zS) = cj , j ∈ N, (14)
yS, zS ≥ 0, S ∈ S. (15)
We show that there exists a dual feasible solution (y¯, z¯) such that x¯ and
(y¯, z¯) satisfy the complementary slackness conditions:
(a′) for every S ∈ S, if y¯S > 0 then
∑
j∈S x¯j = f(S);
(b′) for every S ∈ S, if z¯S > 0 then
∑
j∈S x¯j = g(S).
Note that since x¯ satisfies (6)–(7),
∑
j∈S x¯j = f(S) if and only if {x¯j :
j ∈ S} = {1, . . . , |S|}, and
∑
j∈S x¯j = g(S) if and only if {x¯j : j ∈ S} =
{d−|S|+1, . . . , d}. Then we can rewrite conditions (a′) and (b′) as follows:
(a) for every S ∈ S, if y¯S > 0 then {x¯j : j ∈ S} = {1, . . . , |S|};
(b) for every S ∈ S, if z¯S > 0 then {x¯j : j ∈ S} = {d− |S|+ 1, . . . , d}.
Observe that if m = 1 then Algorithm 13 reduces to the algorithm given
in [Mag13] and thus returns an optimal solution. Therefore in this case
there exists a dual solution (y¯, z¯) satisfying the complementary slackness
conditions.
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Let p be the number of distinct pseudo-costs at the end of the algorithm,
and q be the number of distinct nonzero costs of the variables in Um:
p = |{γj : j ∈ [d]}|, q = |{cj : cj 6= 0, j ∈ Um}|.
Assume by contradiction that there is no dual solution satisfying conditions
(a) and (b). Among all instances with this property, we choose an instance
I such that the vector (m, p+ q) is lexicographically minimum. As observed
above, m ≥ 2.
Case 1 Suppose that cj = 0 for all j ∈ Um. If we remove the mth all-
different constraint and variables xj with j ∈ Um, we obtain a new instance
I ′ withm−1 constraints (note thatm−1 ≥ 1). If we run the algorithm (with
the same tie-breaking choices as we did for instance I), we execute exactly
the same operations as in the first m− 1 iterations of the algorithm applied
to instance I. Then, since cj = 0 for all j ∈ Um, the final pseudo-costs are
the same for I and I ′. Thus we obtain a solution x¯′ for I ′ which is identical
to x¯, except that x¯′ does not have the entries with index j ∈ Um. Then,
by the minimality of I, for I ′ there is a dual solution (y¯, z¯) that satisfies
conditions (a) and (b). One immediately checks that this dual solution is
also feasible for the original instance I, and conditions (a) and (b) are still
satisfied. This is a contradiction.
Case 2 Assume that cj 6= 0 for some j ∈ Um. Wlog, cj > 0 for some
j ∈ Um. Define c
∗ = max{cj : j ∈ Um} > 0 and C = {j ∈ Um : cj = c
∗}.
Recall that, for j ∈ N , r(j) denotes the index of the cluster containing
j. We extend this notation to subsets: for J ⊆ N , we define r(J) = {r(j) :
j ∈ J}.
Define A = r(C) and γ0 = min{γj : j ∈ A}. We claim that if γj ≥ γ0
for some j /∈ A, then j ∈ Tm. To see this, assume by contradiction that
there is an index j /∈ A ∪ Tm such that γj ≥ γ0. Since j /∈ A, Vj was not
assigned a variable in C; and since j /∈ Tm, cluster Vj was feasible at the
mth iteration of the algorithm. This implies that before the execution of
the mth iteration the pseudo-cost γj was at most as large as γk for every
k ∈ A. But then the final pseudo-cost γj would be smaller than the final
pseudo-cost γk for k ∈ A (because if Vj is assigned some variable at the mth
iteration, the cost of this variable is by assumption smaller than c∗, while
Vk is assigned a variable of cost c
∗). If we choose k to be an index in A such
that γk = γ0, we obtain a contradiction, as we assumed γj ≥ γ0 = γk.
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Define B = {j ∈ Tm : cj ≥ γ0}. Note that r(B) = B and γj = cj for
j ∈ Tm. By the above observation, γj ≥ γ0 if and only if j ∈ A ∪ B. Since
r(B ∪ C) = A ∪B, this implies that
{x¯j : j ∈ B ∪ C} = {1, . . . , |B ∪C|}. (16)
Let cˆ = max{cj : cj < c
∗, j ∈ Um}, with cˆ = −∞ if cj = c
∗ for all
j ∈ Um, and γˆ = max{γj : γj < γ0}, with γˆ = −∞ if γ0 is the minimum of
all pseudo-costs. Define δ = min{c∗, c∗ − cˆ, γ0 − γˆ} > 0.
Construct a new instance I ′ that is identical to I, except that the costs
now are
c′j =
{
cj − δ, j ∈ B ∪ C,
cj , j /∈ B ∪ C.
We claim that by applying the algorithm to this new instance (with the
same tie-breaking choices as for instance I) we obtain the same solution
x¯′ = x¯. To see this, observe that the first m− 1 iterations of the algorithm
are identical for I and I ′, as we only changed the costs of some variables
in Nm. After the (m − 1)th iteration, the ordering of the variables in Um
that we chose at line 6 when solving instance I is still non-increasing for
the new instance, as c′j = c
∗ − δ ≥ cˆ for j ∈ C. Furthermore, again after
the (m− 1)th iteration, the pseudo-costs of the clusters Vj with j /∈ Tm are
the same as they were for instance I. Thus the assignment of the elements
in Um to feasible clusters is the same for the two instances. It follows that
after the mth iteration the pseudo-costs for the new instance are
γ′j =
{
γj − δ, j ∈ A ∪B,
γj , j /∈ A ∪B.
Since γ′j = γj − δ ≥ γ0 − δ ≥ γˆ for all j ∈ A ∪ B, the ordering of line 11 is
still non-increasing. We then obtain the same solution as for instance I, as
claimed.
By the choice of δ, for I ′ either the number of distinct pseudo-costs is
q − 1 (this happens if δ = γ0 − γˆ), or the number of distinct nonzero costs
of the variables in Um is p − 1 (this happens if δ ∈ {c
∗, c∗ − cˆ}). Then,
by the minimality of instance I, there is a dual solution (y¯, z¯) that satisfies
conditions (a) and (b) for I ′. By setting y¯B∪C = δ, we obtain a dual solution
for the original instance I, with conditions (a) and (b) still satisfied because
of (16). This is a contradiction.
Corollary 3.2. Under the inclusion property, system (8)–(9) is totally dual
integral.
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Proof. The above proof shows that if c is an integer vector then there is
an optimal dual solution with integer components. (The existence of such
a solution when m = 1, which is needed in the base step of the proof, was
shown in [Mag13].)
Note that the proof of Theorem 3.1 immediately yields an algorithm that
constructs an optimal dual solution, given the output of Algorithm 13. The
dual algorithm can be summarized as follows. When q > 0, the costs of the
variables and the pseudo-costs are modified, and either p or q is decreased
by one; then either an entry of y¯ or an entry of z¯ is set to some positive
value δ. When q = 0, the mth all-different constraint is removed and the
procedure is iterated.
3.1 A remark
One might wonder whether Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 can be proved
more directly through the theory of submodular functions.
A set function k : 2N → R is submodular if
k(S1) + k(S2) ≥ k(S1 ∪ S2) + k(S1 ∩ S2) for every S1, S2 ⊆ N,
while a set function h : 2N → R is supermodular if
h(S1) + h(S2) ≤ h(S1 ∪ S2) + h(S1 ∩ S2) for every S1, S2 ⊆ N. (17)
It is known that if h (resp., k) is a supermodular (resp., submodular) func-
tion defined on 2N , then the polyhedron described by the inequalities∑
j∈S
xj ≥ h(S), S ⊆ N, (18)
∑
j∈S
xj ≤ k(S), S ⊆ N, (19)
is totally dual integral: this is a classical result on polymatroids [Edm70]
(see also [Sch03, Theorem 46.2]).
In our system (8)–(9), f and g are not defined for every S ⊆ N , but
only for S ⊆ Ni with i ∈ [m]. Assume that, under the inclusion property, f
(resp., g) can be extended to a supermodular function h (resp., submodular
function k) defined on 2N in such a way that the integer solutions to (18)–
(19) are precisely the integer vectors in the convex hull of (6)–(7). Then
Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 would follow immediately. However, we now
show that in general such an extension does not exist.
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Consider the all-different system with N = {1, 2, 3}, m = 2, N1 = {1, 2},
N2 = {2, 3}. The inclusion property is clearly satisfied. We show that
if h, k : 2N → R are extensions of f, g such that the integer solutions to
(18)–(19) are precisely the integer vectors in the convex hull of (6)–(7),
then h violates inequality (17) for S1 = N1 and S2 = N2. First, note
that h(N1) = f(N1) = 3, h(N2) = f(N2) = 3, and h(N1 ∩ N2) = f(N1 ∩
N2) = 1, while f is not defined for the set N1 ∪ N2 = {1, 2, 3}. Since
the vector (x¯1, x¯2, x¯3) = (1, 2, 1) is a feasible solution, (18) holds only if
h(N1 ∪N2) = h({1, 2, 3}) ≤ x¯1 + x¯2 + x¯3 = 4. Then h(N1) + h(N2) = 6 and
h(N1 ∪N2) + h(N1 ∩N2) ≤ 5, and therefore h violates inequality (17).
4 An extension
We finally present an extension of Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2. In what
follows, we say that a function φ : N → R is convex (resp., concave) if the
piecewise linear interpolation of φ is convex (resp., concave).
Consider a system of the form∑
j∈S
xj ≥ f(S), S ⊆ Ni, i ∈ [m], (20)
−
∑
j∈S
xj ≥ −g(S), S ⊆ Ni, i ∈ [m], (21)
where f(S) = α(|S|) for some convex function α : N→ R and g(S) = β(|S|)
for some concave function β : N → R, with α(0) = β(0) = 0. We assume
that α(k) ≤ β(k) for all k ∈ N, otherwise the system is infeasible. Note that
system (8)–(9) is of this form.
When m = 1, system (20)–(21) is totally dual integral. This follows from
the fact that f is a supermodular function and g is a submodular function
(see [Lov83, Proposition 5.1]), along with the result on polymatroids men-
tioned in Section 3.1. However, in general the above system is not totally
dual integral for m > 1. We now observe that we have total dual integrality
if the inclusion property holds.
Theorem 4.1. Assume that f(S) = α(|S|) for some convex function α :
N → R and g(S) = β(|S|) for some concave function β : N → R, with
α(k) ≤ β(k) for all k ∈ N and α(0) = β(0) = 0. Then, under the inclusion
property, system (20)–(21) is totally dual integral. Thus, if α and β are
integer valued, the polyhedron defined by inequalities (20)–(21) is integral.
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Proof. We extend Algorithm 13 so that it solves linear optimization over
(20)–(21). The only modification is at line 12: if variable xj is in cluster
Vk (where k = r(j)) and γk ≥ 0, we set x¯j = α(k) − α(k − 1); otherwise,
if γk < 0, we set x¯j = β(k) − β(k − 1). Note that when f and g are the
functions defined in (5), this new version of the algorithm reduces to the
original form of Algorithm 13.
In the following we show that the solution returned by the modified algo-
rithm is feasible for (20)–(21), and then we observe that it can be completed
with a dual solution satisfying the complementary slackness conditions.
We show that x¯ satisfies (20) for every S ⊆ Ni, i ∈ [m]. First we observe
that since α is a convex function,
α(k)− α(k − 1) ≤ α(h) − α(h− 1) for every h ≥ k ≥ 1. (22)
Now fix S ⊆ Ni for some i ∈ [m]. If we define S
+ = {j ∈ S : γr(j) ≥ 0} and
S− = {j ∈ S : γr(j) < 0}, then∑
j∈S
x¯j =
∑
j∈S+
(
α(r(j)) − α(r(j) − 1)
)
+
∑
j∈S−
(
β(r(j)) − β(r(j) − 1)
)
≥
∑
j∈S
(
α(r(j)) − α(r(j) − 1)
)
≥
|S|∑
k=1
(
α(k) − α(k − 1)
)
= α(|S|) = f(S),
(23)
where the first inequality holds because α(k) ≤ β(k) for all k ∈ N, and
the second inequality follows from (22) along with the fact that the indices
r(j) for j ∈ S are pairwise distinct. This shows that x¯ satisfies (20); for
inequalities (21), the proof is similar.
The rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 3.1, except
that conditions (a) and (b) need to be adapted to this more general context.
Note that the complementary slackness conditions take again the form (a′)–
(b′) of the proof of Theorem 3.1. By (23), it follows that
∑
j∈S x¯j = f(S) if
and only if {x¯j : j ∈ S} = {α(k)−α(k − 1) : k = 1, . . . , |S|}. Therefore, the
complementary slackness conditions can be written in the following form:
(a) for every S ∈ S, if y¯S > 0 then {x¯j : j ∈ S} = {α(k) − α(k − 1) : k =
1, . . . , |S|};
(b) for every S ∈ S, if z¯S > 0 then {x¯j : j ∈ S} = {β(k) − β(k − 1) : k =
1, . . . , |S|}.
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The proof now proceeds as for Theorem 3.1.
The above result implies in particular that Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2
also hold if D is an arbitrary finite subset of R (with |D| ≥ n), provided that
f(S) (resp., g(S)) is defined as the sum of the |S| smallest (resp., largest)
elements in D for every S ⊆ N .
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